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1 Introduction
European Central Bank control over inflation in the Eurosystem is based on the
power to affect interest rates in the economy. In practical terms the attention is
focused on the average transaction rate in the interbank market, which is later
used as a benchmark for loans and deposits of commercial institutions. How the
Central Bank tools can affect the interbank market is then the central issue for
the effectiveness of the monetary policy implementation and the topic of this
paper.
Analysing the main features of the money market might suggest that the
Central Bank has a near complete control. Commercial banks need funds to
process and facilitate transactions performed by their customers every day. In
addition, they need to satisfy the reserve requirement and are not allowed any
overdraft on their account in the Central Bank. Available sources of liquidity,
which include open market operations and standing facilities, are directly con-
trolled by the Central Bank. Closer inspection, however, reveals areas where
that control is not so tight: banks need to maintain an average value of funds
on their account, meaning they might chose to keep less one day and compen-
sate later on. This can have very important consequences (first pointed out
by Hamilton (1996) as the so-called martingale hypothesis): If there were no
additional barriers to trade, the current rate must be the same as the expected
rate in the future in order to prevent arbitrage opportunities. In that case,
however, the interest rate is determined by the market expectations rather than
by liquidity controlled by the Central Bank.
The martingale hypothesis was initially rejected by Hamilton (1996), who
attributed the deviation to the trading costs. More recent econometric papers
by Moschitz (2004), Würtz (2003) (for Eurosystem) and Thornton (2001) (for
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Cassola, Flemming Würtz, Rune Stenbacka, Erkki Koskela and Tuomas Välimäki for
their helpful comments and suggestions. The research was supported by OP-ryhmän
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the USA) fail to find evidence against this hypothesis for most of the days of
the maintenance period. However, the same researchers find that the market
liquidity becomes an important determinant of the interbank interest rate on
the last days of the maintenance period.
The theoretical contributions include models of Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-
Mendizábal (2006), Välimäki (2003), Clouse and Dow Jr. (2002) and Bartolini
et al. (2001) that focus on explaining the increase in the average level of the
interest rate and interest rate volatility at the end of the maintenance period
without using trade barriers. The models are constructed in a very similar way
and all include so-called liquidity shock as defined initially by Poole (1968). This
term captures all the liquidity flows that were not anticipated by a commercial
bank when it was deciding on its borrowing value in the interbank market. One
example might be a late transaction request received after the trading day is
over.
From the banks’ perspective, such liquidity shocks introduce a costly ran-
domness into the final end of the day current account balance that is, in turn,
used to satisfy the obligatory reserve requirement. Consider, for example, a
situation where a positive liquidity shock causes the bank account to exceed the
remaining part of reserve requirement for this maintenance period. Any excess
funds must then be deposited at the penalty rate, which is significantly below
the market rate. To avoid such an expensive operation, banks need to make
sure the current account before the shock realisation remains at the appropriate
level. Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) show that this can result
in additional incentives for, so-called, back-loading.1 If all banks share similar
incentives, the liquidity becomes more valuable at the end of the maintenance
period, which might explain the pattern in the interest rate behaviour that was
observed in many interbank markets in the late 90s.
Even though the liquidity shock is a central issue in most of the papers on
the interbank market, its properties have not been properly analysed thus far.
In fact, to the author’s knowledge, there has not been any attempt to estimate
the statistical parameters based on actual market data. Also, there is no paper
that clearly compares the behaviour of the models using significantly different
shock realisations. In this paper, I address these issues.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, I present a calibration of
the size of the liquidity shock based on actual Eurosystem money market data.
Second, I show that the magnitude of the shock compared to the current account
balance determines the results of standard models. The combination of these
two observations can then be used to explain the behaviour of the interbank
interest rate during the maintenance period.
These results have direct and important consequences for the implementa-
1Back-loading bank postpones satisfaction of the reserve requirement until the later part of
the maintenance period by keeping the current account value below the average level required.
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tion of the monetary policy. For the majority of the maintenance period, the
interest rate is linked to the expected level on the settlement day and the days
preceding it, and changes in liquidity (so-called liquidity effect) have little im-
pact. Market liquidity, however, determines the level of the interest rate on the
last days of the maintenance period, which can be used by the Central Bank
to control the expectations. These findings are in line with the econometric
analyses performed by Würtz (2003) and Moschitz (2004).
In section 2, I start with a general discussion on the interbank market by
describing the components of the demand and supply of funds.
In section 3, I use a modified version of the standard Poole (1968) model
based on Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) and Kempa (2006).
I show that the equilibrium interest rate depends on the probabilities of using
standing facilities and the so-called dynamic cost factor that captures the rela-
tive cost to early satisfy the reserve requirement. I also show the limitations of
the theoretical model that justify the use of simulations later on in the paper.
In section 4, I use the data obtained from the ECB to calibrate the volatility
of the shock, which turns out to be a critical parameter. I find that the standard
deviation of the shock is very small and around 10% of the average current
account holdings. This means that the banks face only minor risks.
Section 5 contains the theoretical portion of the paper. I show how the
behaviour of the model changes when I use different values of the shock distri-
bution parameters. I show that there exists a flat part in the demand schedule
where borrowing cannot be uniquely determined under risk neutrality. The
range of the flat schedule changes on different days of the maintenance period
and essentially disappears when the remaining part of the reserve requirement
drops below 6∗σ, where σ is the standard deviation of the liquidity shock. This
suggests that the interest rate will follow the martingale process for the majority
of the maintenance period and might only deviate shortly before the settlement
day (when the remaining required reserves drop low).
Finally, in section 6, I simulate the behaviour of the market under several
different scenarios using the calibrated parameters. I find confirmation for the
theoretical results from the previous section; it seems that the interest rate
follows the martingale hypothesis for all but the last days of the maintenance
period, lending strong support to the results obtained by Moschitz (2004) and
Würtz (2003). Section 7 concludes.
2 The interbank market in the Eurosystem
This section introduces some of the key features of the interbank market that
constitute the basis of the model derived later on. I also present several stylised
facts that can be explained using the model.
The role of the short-term (typically overnight) interbank market is to re-
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distribute the available liquidity among its participants. The liquidity takes the
form of deposits at the Central Bank and is used to settle transactions between
the commercial banks and to satisfy the obligatory reserve requirement. The
reserve requirement is implemented in the form of a so-called averaging provi-
sion. This means that banks are required to maintain an average for the current
account over a certain period of time, referred in the text as the maintenance
period.
The average transaction rate is used as the benchmark for other rates in
the economy and remains the main operating target of the Central Bank. The
market, as a whole, is subject to aggregate liquidity changes resulting from
transactions such as cash withdrawals that require the exchange of some por-
tion of the Central Bank deposits for banknotes and coins. The factors that
affect aggregate liquidity and that are not directly controlled by the Central
Bank are, in the literature, referred to as autonomous liquidity factors.
2.1 Interbank interest rate
2.2 Aggregate liquidity
The supply of aggregate liquidity remains at the Central Bank discretion. Once
the aggregate liquidity is settled during the open market operations, its balance
can only be altered by changes in the autonomous liquidity factors (ALF). These
include, for example, cash, government accounts and other elements of the base
money that are not controlled directly by the Central Bank. The ability to
predict these changes is typically one of the main concerns of the Central Bank,
which uses the aggregate liquidity to affect the interbank rate. Even though
sophisticated and accurate tools were developed to forecast such changes, policy
design occasionally limits the ability to fully accommodate them. For instance,
in the Eurosystem, the main refinancing operations are performed only once
a week, while changes to ALF take place every day. Therefore, the market
liquidity might and will deviate (at least for a short time) from the Central
Bank’s target level.
The degree to which the aggregate change in the liquidity will influence the
interest rate is signified by the liquidity effect and can be well assessed using
econometric methods. A common approach involves regressing changes in the
market rate on the aggregate imbalance measured by the the net recourse to
standing facility. Studies done by Würtz (2003) and Moschitz (2004) for the
Eurosystem data show that the effect is only present in the last two days of
the maintenance period. My own calculations, based on the publicly available
data for the period March 2004 - April 2006, return an estimate for the liquidity
effect on the last day of the maintenance period at 0.0754 (a EUR 1B imbalance
results in a rate change of 7 basis). Similar studies by Hamilton (1997) and
Thornton (2001) for the US markets also find little evidence of the effect.
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2.3 Individual liquidity and liquidity shock
The demand for reserves by the commercial banks is determined first by the
obligatory reserve requirement and, second, by their balance of transactions
with other market participants. The reserve requirement is known in advance
at the start of the maintenance period. The balance of transactions can typically
be estimated quite accurately by the bank itself based on past time experiences.
For example, a large mortgage bank can predict substantial inflows of liquidity
on days when its customers are making loan repayments.
Even though the forecasts might be quite accurate, there is still some uncer-
tainty that banks need to account for. It stems primarily from:
• late transactions (finalised after the trading day is over) or errors in trans-
action processing
• market imperfections preventing the bank from obtaining the desired liq-
uidity.
The effect from later transactions is fairly straightforward but less significant
in developed markets. Historically, when the information technology was barely
developed, the transactions between banks’ customers were processed in clear-
ing sessions. Sometimes, the outcome of the session was announced after trade
was concluded (or close to the end of the trading day). In this case, banks that
needed liquidity to cover the balance of payments of their customers had no
way of obtain the funds on the market and had to resort to the Central Bank
facilities. Nowadays, with the RTGS systems2 in place, this problem might have
be less severe.
The effect of market imperfections could result from certain situations when
a commercial bank’s ability to trade is hindered by external factors. For exam-
ple, uncertainty about the bank’s financial condition might result in the restric-
tions of funds available for trade in the form of credit lines. Some banks obtain
the majority of their funding through unsecured borrowing from a selected group
of banks, which form a so-called trading group. If the trade between different
trading groups is restricted, even though the total market liquidity is sufficient
to satisfy the reserve requirement, some banks will find themselves short and
others with surplus funds.
The examples given above concern the individual bank balances but not
the aggregate liquidity. However, it is also possible that the bank will face an
unexpected transaction that will also have an impact on the aggregate market
liquidity. For example, a surge in cash withdrawals might force several banks to
exchange excess portion of their deposits for banknotes and coins. All aggregate
changes are, however, closely watched by the Central Bank and in case of the
ECB they are offset during open market operations. This allows me to focus
2Real Time Gross Settlement
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mainly on the idiosyncratic sources of errors in liquidity forecasts.
From a commercial bank’s perspective, the effects of late transactions and
market imperfections are, in fact, similar and constitute a random deviation
between the current account balance at the end of the day and the expected
level. This motivates their combined modelling, and, in this paper I refer to
them as liquidity shocks. In the remaining part of this section, I discuss the
various statistical properties and theoretical assumptions required for liquidity
shock modelling.
2.4 Modelling liquidity shock
The liquidity shock, denoted as εt for the remainder of the paper, is the key
element of the model. If all banks could perfectly predict their current account
balances, no buffer would be necessary for the purpose of averaging the reserve
requirement.3 Some of the modelling assumptions need, however, a bit of ex-
planation.
First, as noted before, I have chosen to focus on individual sources of uncer-
tainty rather than aggregate ones. In practice, I assume that the Central Bank
compensates for changes in the autonomous liquidity factors (which affect the
total market liquidity) on a daily basis, even though, in reality, the operations
take place once a week.
Second, I assume the shock is identically and independently distributed. I
assume a normal distribution with an expected value equal to zero and the
standard deviation σ. A zero mean reflects the fact that that the banks do
not expect the shock to be biased toward neither a surplus nor a shortage of
liquidity. There might be a pattern in the actual market that would link some
bank characteristics with expected liquidity shocks. For instance, large banks
tend to be net liquidity borrowers, which might suggest that the liquidity shock
they face would be, on average, negative. However, due to the lack of available
data, I am unable to perform a thorough analysis on that issue, and for the
remainder of the paper, I simply assume a symmetric distribution.
The value of σ is calibrated in section 4.1. I assume the standard deviation of
the liquidity shock to be proportional to the size of the bank as measured by the
average Central Bank account balance. This might require some justification.
On one hand, it is quite sensible to assume that large banks with a siz-
able consumer base, involved in multiple complicated operations are subject
to a larger absolute amount of errors in transaction processing and a larger
3Averaging reserve requirement means that the banks have to satisfy an average reserve
requirement within the maintenance period, but are free to chose their daily values. That
means, that random deviation from the target assigned by the Central Bank will not force
the immediate use of the standing facilities provided that the bank can compensate for this
in the following days.
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number of later transactions. In addition, large banks are more likely to run
into problems with market depths, especially if the trading groups they operate
with are small and unable to satisfy their demand for liquidity (or alternatively
absorb surpluses). On the other hand, large banks can probably afford more
staff, whereby the transactions would be handled more carefully, and liquidity
flows would be more accurately predicted with the ultimate result that fewer
errors would be made. It is, however, unlikely that those benefits will be able
to fully compensate for the scale of their operations, hence, the liquidity shock
and corresponding liquidity shock variance are likely to linked to the bank size.
3 The model
This section presents an overview of the model of the interbank market, which
constitutes the basis of the simulation study in section 6. The setup of the
model can already be considered standard and has been extensively described,
for example, in Poole (1968), followed by Hamilton (1996) and, more recently,
Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006), Välimäki (2003) and Bartolini
et al. (2001), as well as my own papers.
The model illustrates the behaviour of the individual bank in the interbank
market with the averaging reserve requirement provision regime. Each bank has
the obligatory reserve requirement, initial assets (assumed to be just sufficient
to satisfy the requirement) and the decision regarding how to use them. Some
liquidity can be lent to other banks and the remainder will be stored in the Cen-
tral Bank’s current account and will contribute to the reserve requirement. The
bank can also borrow the funds from the market if such is found to be profitable.
The timing of events in the model for each day of the maintenance period is
as follows:
mt, dt bt εt mt+1, dt+1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
The bank starts the day with assets mt and a deficiency dt from the previous
day. It can lend out the assets or acquire more through interbank borrowing
represented by the term bt, which can also be interpreted as a simple demand for
liquidity at market rate. The liquidity shock, εt, was explained in more detail in
the previous section. It signifies the random effects that the commercial bank
is unable to foresee or counter which will ultimately affect its end-of-the-day
current account value. I assume the shocks to be independently and identically
distributed with a zero mean and a standard deviation σ.
These three factors contribute to the final end of day current account bal-
ance mt + bt + εt (a negative bt would mean that the bank is lending).
The last term, deficiency dt, represents the remaining portion of the reserve
requirement to be satisfied, and follows a simple equation of motion:
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d1 = R = m1 ∗ T (1)
dt =
 dt−1 if mt + bt + εt < 0dt−1 −mt − bt − εt if 0 < mt + bt + εt < dt−10 if mt + bt + εt > dt−1 (2)
where R is the exogenously given value of the reserve requirement set by the
Central Bank (equal to the daily requirement multiplied by the number of days
in the maintenance period). I assume that the bank’s starting assets are suffi-
cient to satisfy that requirement.4 I provide the following explanation for eq.(1).
On day 1, the bank receives information about the average value of the reserve
requirement for the maintenance period, which is equal to its initial assets m1.
This means that during T days, the total value of the current account balances
needed to satisfy the requirement is m1 ∗ T .
At the end of day 1, the bank will have the current account balance m1 +
b1 + ε1 which will be used to satisfy some part of the reserve requirement. At
the start of day 2, the remaining part of the deficiency is d1−m1− b1− ε1. The
end-of-the-day balance might also be less than zero, in which case no reserve
requirement is satisfied, or the balance is sufficient for the entire requirement to
be satisfied.
The bank’s problem is to minimise the borrowing cost by choosing an appro-
priate value for bt.5 A bank’s performance in one maintenance period does not
affect another maintenance period, hence, the problem concerns a finite number
of days. That also means that the solution has a different structure in the last
day of the reserve maintenance period and for the days preceding it, which is
shown (and explained) in the following part.
3.1 Time T
The problem concerning the last day of the maintenance period is indeed the
same for any case without an averaging provision reserve requirement regime
and was already solved by Poole (1968).
For the last day of the maintenance period, t = T the bank must only satisfy
the remaining part of the reserve requirement. Since interbank loans have one
period maturity, and no deficiency is carried over to next maintenance period,
4The ECB uses the term benchmark allotment to describe how much total liquidity is
needed every day to satisfy the reserve requirement. This value is usually targeted during open
market operations, so the market is left with no aggregate surplus or shortage of liquidity.
5In practice, the bank obtains its liquidity from either bidding in open market operations
or interbank borrowing but, I do not differentiate between these two. This assumption is not
particularly restrictive. In fact, it is sufficient to assume that the expected tender rate is equal
to the expected interbank rate, which can be easily argued with a simple arbitrage argument.
Hence, the funds obtained during liquidity tenders should be perfect substitutes for the funds
obtained through interbank borrowing.
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this is a single period problem. The bank minimises the cost of obtaining funds
to cover a potential liquidity shock:
VT = min
bT
iT bT + E(cT ) (3)
where iT bT stands for the cost of borrowing (for a negative bT , the bank is
the net lender). E(cT ) denotes the expected cost of using the standing facilities
(occurring whenever the account value is different from the reserve requirement)
given by
E(cT ) = il
[∫ −mT−bT+dT
−∞
(−mT − bT + dT − εT )f(εT )dεT
]
−
id
[∫ ∞
−mT−bT+dT
(mT + bT − dT + εT )f(εT )dεT
]
, (4)
where f(ε) denotes the density function of the shock and il, id are the lending
and deposit facility respectively. Equation (4) means that a shock εT realisation
higher (lower) than the account balance mT +bT −dT forces the use of a deposit
(lending) facility at rate id
(
il
)
. The first order conditions associated with
problem (3) provide a well-known result:6
iT = ilF (−mT − bT + dT ) + id(1− F (−mT − bT + dT )). (5)
At the optimal volume of borrowing, the probability weighted cost of using
standing facilities is equal to the cost of obtaining funds in the market.
For the interest rate in the middle of the interest rate corridor7, the aggregate
market liquidityMT and aggregate deficiencyDT make it possible to solve eq.(5)
to obtain the equilibrium condition:
F (−MT +DT ) = 0.5 (6)
which for the symmetric distribution of shocks implies
MT = DT . (7)
This result is used by the central bankers that attempt to set the value of
the aggregate market liquidity in their operations in order to control the level
of the interest rate on the last day of the maintenance period.8
An interesting observation can be made by analysing the derivatives of the
value function:
∂VT
∂mT
= −iT (8)
and
∂VT
∂dT
= iT . (9)
6As shown in Appendix B.
7Equal to it = ß
l+id
2
.
8The ECB refers to that value as benchmark liquidity.
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The equations first show that the additional deficiency and assets are perfect
substitutes on the last day of maintenance period. Intuitively, it does not matter
for the bank whether it arrives at the last day with one extra euro on the current
account or the remaining reserve requirement one euro smaller. The value of
that additional euro is simply equal to the market price at which it can be lent
(or borrowed) in the market.
3.2 Periods t<T
On the days before the end of the maintenance period, the commercial banks’
borrowing value also has an effect on the remaining part of the deficiency that
needs to be satisfied in the maintenance period. The problem thus becomes
dynamic and can be illustrated by Bellman’s equation:
Vt = min
bt
{itbt + Et(ct) + Et(Vt+1)} . (10)
Solving the problem for optimal borrowing results in the following equilibrium
conditions:9
it = ilF (−bt −mt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.
+ id [1− F (dt − bt −mt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.
−
∫ dt−bt−mt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(εt)dεt︸ ︷︷ ︸
3.
.
(11)
Here, the interest rate is the probability weighted average of three terms, each
of them with a specific interpretation. Term 1 reflects the expected cost of
the shock (negative) falling below the bank’s assets, thus forcing it to use the
lending facility. Term 2, in a similar fashion, reflects the cost of the shock that
exceeds the current deficiency and forces the bank to use the deposit facility.
Finally, the last term gives the value required to satisfy only part of the reserve
requirement and to carry over the deficiency to the next period.
The last term (sometimes called the dynamic cost factor in literature and in
this paper) depends on the derivative of the value function that is given by the
following equation:
∂Vt
∂dt
= −id [1− F (dt − bt −mt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.
+
∫ dt−bt−mt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(εt)dεt︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
. (12)
In practice, the cost of carrying over an additional unit of deficiency depends
on whether the bank is locked-in, that is, all the deficiency is satisfied. If this
is the case, extra funds must be deposited at the Central Bank interest rate id
(term 1), otherwise the extra unit will simply be carried into another period
9As shown in Appendix C
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(term 2).
A demand schedule based on the equation (11) is illustrated in Figure 1.
Note, that some parts of the figure are flat, which means that the demand for
liquidity, at certain interest rate levels, is not uniquely determined. More details
and exact interpretation of the shape will be included in the latter part of the
paper, in section 5.1.
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Figure 1: 3-day maintenance period
3.3 Example: reserve maintenance period with 3 days
In this example, I am going to show how the model can be used to analytically
calculate the individual bank demand for liquidity under the assumption that
the expected rate is equal to the Central Bank’s target set in the middle of the
standing facilities corridor10.
10The corridor is defined by standing facility rates. The Central Bank promises to accept
any values of deposits at its lower boundary (id), and similarly grants unlimited loans at its
11
Due to the recursive structure of the problem, I start the solution from the
last day of the RMP.
Day 3
On day 3, I have the same solution as in section 3.1. The market clearing
rate equals (5):
i3 = ilF (−m3 − b3 + d3) + id(1− F (−m3 − b3 + d3)) (13)
and the liquidity, which holds the rate at the middle of the interest rate
corridor, is given by the following relationship
m3 + b3 = d3. (14)
For the interest rate to stay in the middle of the corridor, the market should
have just enough liquidity to satisfy the reserve requirement.
The derivative of the value function is then ∂V3∂d3 = −i3 with the same inter-
pretation as in section 3.1.
Day 2
On day 2, I can use the fact that the future value function derivative is fixed
for all banks regardless of their assets, hence for each bank:
i2 = ilF (−b2 −m2) + id [1− F (d2 − b2 −m2)]
+
∫ d2−b2−m2
−b2−m2
E(i3)f(ε2)dε2 (15)
so
i2 = ilF (−b2 −m2) + id [1− F (d2 − b2 −m2)]
+ E(i3) [F (d2 − b2 −m2)− F (−b2 −m2)] . (16)
This has a similar interpretation as in section 3.2.
I assume that the expected interest rate in the last period E(i3) is equal to
the Central Bank target in the middle of the corridor system. The condition at
which the market actually clears at the target rate is given by: 11
m2 + b2 =
d2
2
. (17)
This is an intuitive result that indicates that half of the remaining reserve
requirement should be satisfied in order for the interest rate to remain in the
middle of the corridor system. The derivative of the value function takes the
following form for each individual bank:
∂V2
∂d2
= −id [1− F (d2 − b2 −m2)]− E(i3)F (d2 − b2 −m2). (18)
upper boundary (il), thus rendering any transactions outside that range unfeasible. In the
Eurosystem, the corridor is symmetric around a target rate.
11As shown in Appendix D
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Unless deficiency d2 is significantly larger than the current account m2 (so
F (d2 − b2 − m2) = 1), this expression is going to take a different value for
each individual bank, thus rendering the aggregation process more complicated
and intractable.
Day 1
The analytical solution for this period is not possible without further as-
sumptions. To illustrate this fact, I use equation (11) once again. Substituting
(18) for ∂V2∂d2 yields the following relationship at the equilibrium rate:
i1 = ilF (−b1 −m1) + id [1− F (d1 − b1 −m1)]−∫ d1−b1−m1
−b1−m1
[−id [1− F (d2 −m2 − b2)]− E(i3)F (d2 −m2 − b2)] f(ε1)dε1,
(19)
which can be further simplified using (17):
i1 = ilF (−b1 −m1) + id [1− F (d1 − b1 −m1)]
+
∫ d1−b1−m1
−b1−m1
[−id [1− F (d2/2)]− E(i3)F (d2/2)] f(ε1)dε1. (20)
The first two terms look familiar and have the same interpretation as above.
The value of the dynamic cost factor depends, however, on the deficiency d2,
which, in turn, is determined by the liquidity shock realisation. This means
that the analytical solution is no longer possible without distribution function
assumptions. This motivates the use of the numerical tools presented in section
6.
3.4 Summary
In this section, I have introduced a model of the interbank market in which an
averaging provision is utilised and the banks are subject to liquidity shocks. The
model, based on Poole (1968), Välimäki (2003) and Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-
Mendizábal (2006), links the equilibrium interest rate with the demand for liq-
uidity. At optimal borrowing, the cost of financing from the market (given by
interest rate it) is equal to the expected cost of financing with standing facilities
in the future.
In the latter part of this section, I also show how the model can be used to
demonstrate the demand for liquidity for the last two days of the maintenance
period and the limitations that make the analytical solution for the preceding
days intractable. This motivates the use of numerical methods in section 6 for
the purpose of simulating the behaviour of the market.
13
4 Calibration of the parameters for the Eurosys-
tem
4.1 Liquidity shock estimation
In this section, I show the procedure and results for the calibration of the liq-
uidity shock properties. The key parameter is the standard deviation σ of the
liquidity shock. If the shock volatility is low, the commercial banks using the
market could plan the path of the reserve requirement well in advance to avoid
any use of the facilities. A high volatility of the shock means their forecasts are
prone to errors, and recourses to the standing facilities are likely and need to
be taken into consideration. As discussed in section 2.4, I assume the volatility
of the shock is related to the bank size, hence, my focus is on the estimation of
that relationship.
To accomplish that goal, I have gathered the following data12 for N = 86
selected banks covered by the reserve requirement in the Eurosystem, for each
day during the period 24 January 2004 - 31 May 2005:
1. Current account value at the end of the day
2. The use of standing facilities
3. The reserve requirement applicable for the relevant maintenance period
The information was provided by National Central Banks, and includes a num-
ber of banks of different sizes from each country (see table 1). In addition, I
have obtained an extended sample (including the year 2003) for all the banks
except for Germany. The results with the extended period (but without Ger-
many) were very similar to the ones presented below; hence, for the remainder
of the paper, I use a shorter but broader sample.
The results of the calibration are presented in Table 2. In the remaining
part of the section, I will explain the calculation procedure and interpret the
value of the parameters.
First of all, we recall that the liquidity shock occurs after trade is no longer
possible and constitutes an error in the current account forecasts. Hence, if I
knew the target current account value for a sample bank, I could compare it to
the actual realisation and the difference attribute to the shock. This is difficult
to perform during the maintenance period, when banks might choose different
paths for the reserve requirement, depending on their individual expectations
for the interest rate evolution or other motives such as risk aversion. However,
on the last day of the maintenance period, any cost-minimising bank avoiding
costly standing facilities would simply target the current account balance that is
12The data were obtained during an internship at the ECB during the period April - June
2006. I am very grateful to the ECB for the access to the data and all help provided during
this period.
14
Country Number of banks
1 Germany 15
2 France 12
3 Spain 12
4 Italy 11
5 Belgium 6
6 Netherlands 7
7 Ireland 4
8 Finland 4
9 Luxembourg 3
10 Greece 3
11 Portugal 4
12 Austria 5
Total 86
Table 1: Sample Banks
Liquidity
shock
Aggregate shock
volatility
Current account
mean -1.5 -247.8 764.9
standard devia-
tion
66.5 1,740.1 966.4
Table 2: Liquidity shock for the sample
Liquidity shock: net recourse to the standing facilities and excess over the reserve requirement
on the last days of the maintenance period.
Aggregate shock: sum of the net recourse to the standing facilities and excess over the reserve
requirement for the whole sample.
Current account: individual bank’s deposit.
All data in EUR Millions.
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equal to the remaining value of the reserve requirement. That gives me enough
information to compute the liquidity shock for those days. The sample covers 15
maintenance periods, thus providing 15 realisations of liquidity shock for each
individual bank.
The exact procedure to calculate the shock value is fairly straightforward. I
have the data on each bank’s end of the day current account balance after the
use of the standing facilities. This balance, according to the bank regulations,
for the last day of the maintenance period, must not be lower than the remaining
deficiency.
I also have the data on the use of the standing facilities (included in the final
current account balance), so I am able to compute the current account value
directly after the liquidity shock realisation.
Linking this data to the theory presented in section 3 results in the following
relationship:
(final current account)it − (net recourse to standing facilities)it =
mit + bit + εit. (21)
From the available data, I can also compute how much of the reserve require-
ment each bank has satisfied earlier in the period. That corresponds to term dit
from section 3. According to formula (14), a cost minimising bank would target
the current account value equal to the remaining deficiency.
mit + bit = (deficiency)it (22)
This can then be substituted into eq.(21) to obtain an estimate for the
liquidity shock εit:
εit = (final current account)it−
− (net recourse to standing facilities)it − (deficiency)it (23)
Index it indicates the realisation for bank i on day t. The other statistics
from the Table 2 are straightforward. The top entry in the first column gives the
average liquidity shock across all banks included and periods and is computed
as:
1
NT
N∑
i
T∑
t
εit, (24)
where εit is a single shock realisation for bank i at time t. The standard
deviation reported in the second column is computed as the average standard
deviation across all banks included:
1
N
N∑
i
SEi, (25)
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where SEi is the standard deviation of the liquidity shock for bank i.
In order to compute the aggregate shock, I have added up the shocks of all
the banks in the sample. In the last column, I have included the average current
account value I used as an approximation of the bank size. Large banks, with
a wide scale of operations, are likely to have a higher reserve requirement base
and, hence, maintain a higher current account value.
Is the liquidity shock significant in the Eurosystem in light of the results
from Table 2? Compared to the daily current account value, the shock does not
seem to be substantial enough (the next section concentrates on that link a bit
more) to constitute a serious threat of overdraft to the commercial bank. Unless
the bank decides to satisfy the reserve requirement prematurely, the possibility
of a positive shock large enough to force the use of the deposit facility seems
even lower. This means, however, that the probability of using the standing
facilities during the maintenance period is negligible, an issue further covered
in the next section.
Any estimates of the liquidity shock for the Eurosystem should be ap-
proached with care due to the existence of previously mentioned excess re-
serves13. While the model predicts that any excess liquidity will be deposited,
this is often not the case in reality. This has profound consequences for the effi-
cient determination of the liquidity supply. It is not just sufficient to calculate
the proportion of the reserve requirement that remains to be satisfied together
with expected changes in the autonomous liquidity factors. The Central Bank
must also estimate how much of the supplied liquidity will remain “unused” for
any of these purposes, and the error in that estimate will result in the market
imbalance. What makes the exercise tricky is that, unlike the autonomous liq-
uidity factors, the value of the excess reserves might indeed be correlated with
the allotment. As an example, consider a policy in which the Central Bank
forces front-loading behaviour by supplying excess liquidity early in the main-
tenance period and removing it toward the end. One consequence of such a
policy is the increased number of banks that will satisfy the reserve requirement
before the end of the maintenance period, thereby implying an increased prob-
ability of excess reserves. An increase in excess reserves works the same way
as an increase in autonomous liquidity factors and has a negative effect on the
available market liquidity thereby potentially diminishing the effectiveness of
the liquidity supply. In practice, however, no such pattern is observed. Miscal-
culations of the excess reserve value add to the errors when estimating changes
in autonomous liquidity factors and do not distort the aggregate deficiency in a
significant manner.
13Excess reserves are the funds stored in the ECB account which are not reported to the
deposit facility after satisfying all the reserve requirement. The underlying reason for the
existence of those reserves are the costs associated with the standing facilities, which might
discourage some banks from their use.
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parameter value standard error t-value
α -12.094,2 12.680 -0.954
β 0.1027 0.0103 9.98
R2 0.54 - -
Table 3: Regression results
4.2 Parameter calibration
In order to simulate the behaviour of the whole market, I use the numerical
methods presented in the following sections. I will show that the results are
sensitive to the assumed variance of the liquidity shock as compared to the av-
erage current account balance. Using the individual bank data, I can actually
try to estimate that relation for the Eurosystem and compare it to the assump-
tions made in existing literature.
In section 2.4, I discuss the relationship between shock volatility and bank
size. To briefly summarise, large banks probably experience more late transac-
tion requests or transaction errors simply due to the scale of their operations.
They might employ additional staff to deal with those problems more efficiently,
but it is unlikely that they are fully able to compensate for their size. This sug-
gests that the liquidity shock and liquidity shock variance will be higher for
larger banks.
Considering the available data, the first observation concerns extreme het-
erogeneity within the sample. Out of the 86 banks from which I collected data,
the smallest bank average current account value was equal to EUR 230 thou-
sand, while the largest one EUR 4.2 billion. The liquidity shock variance is
likely to depend on several variables other than just the size of the bank. Bank
type, country of origin and even ownership structure might determine the degree
of randomness the bank is facing. Unfortunately, I do not have such detailed
information, hence, the estimates presented here must be taken with caution.
Given the available information, I can approximate the parameters of the
liquidity shock using a basic regression. The estimated equation takes the form:
SEi = α+ β ai + . (26)
SEi is the average standard deviation of liquidity shocks for bank i measured
across 15 realisations for the last days of the maintenance period. ai is a simple
average current account value for bank i and  is the error term. The results of
the regression are presented in the Table 3.
The parameter β, which is the key for my model, is statistically significant
with a sufficient level of confidence to justify its use in the simulation stage. It
seems that the volatility the banks are facing is indeed quite small when compar-
ing the values assumed, for example, in Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal
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(2006) (their corresponding β parameter was close to one). The discussion of
the impact of the parameter value on the model behaviour is included in the
section 5, but the results of the paper are robust with respect to substantial
deviations from this estimate.
In the simulation, I had to take into account grid limitations (I calculate
the possible states for the grid size equal to 3 times the shock standard devia-
tion) and assumed the shock with a standard deviation of 10% of the current
account value. Recalculating the simulation with an even lower volatility does
not change the results; using significantly higher values, however, moves the re-
sults toward those of other researchers. This only occurs at the shock standard
deviation that is equal to roughly daily account value, which leaves me plenty
of room for potential estimation errors.
5 The simulation study description and discus-
sion
In this section, I apply the model discussed above to verify the behaviour of the
interbank market given the estimated parameter values. The detailed descrip-
tion of the simulation method can be found in Appendix A.
5.1 The shape of the demand schedule for risk neutral
banks
Before I move on to simulations, it is useful to once again come back to the de-
mand schedule for an individual bank. Figure 1. presents the demand curves for
the last 3 days of the maintenance period. To construct that figure, I arbitrarily
assumed the current account balance and a daily reserve requirement equal to
roughly 160 units. The liquidity shock has an assumed standard deviation of 50
units, which is much larger than my estimate but allows the pictures to remain
clear.
Flat parts of the demand schedule, multiple borrowing values and the
reserve requirement
First of all, note that for the days preceding the end of the maintenance period,
there is a flat part of the demand schedule where different values of market liq-
uidity result in the same interest rate. The size of the flat buffer is determined
by the reserve requirement as documented in Figure 2, where I drew several
demand curves with different value for the starting assets (corresponding to the
reserve requirement). As the relative volatility increases, the flat part becomes
shorter and shorter.
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Figure 2: Different values of reserve requirement
It is perhaps easier to understand the relationship between the average cur-
rent account value and the shock volatility by combining the graphical and
algebraic interpretation. In order to draw Figure 2, I have assumed a normal
distribution of the liquidity shock and have limited the grid of possible shocks
to three times the standard deviation σ.14 This is a fairly mild assumption,
widely used in the related literature, that covers 95% of the distribution and it
is necessary to use numerical tools. With this assumption, however, I can solve
equation (11) for three special cases.
Case 1 Large lending value (bt < −mt − 3 ∗ σ)
The condition bt < −mt − 3 ∗ σ can be transformed into −bt − mt > 3 ∗ σ.
Thus, assuming the shock realisation will never exceed three times its standard
deviation, the expressions F (−bt−mt)→ 1 which implies also F (dt−bt−mt)→
1. This means that the probability of a negative current account balance, at the
14The assumption is also used in the simulation study.
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end of the day, is one, and the bank will be forced to to use the Central Bank
borrowing facility. Lending even more does not affect that probability (since
it is already close to one), hence, the demand schedule is flat. Of course, the
bank would only agree to lend so much at a market rate that no lower than the
lending facility rate. In fact, using F (−bt−mt) = 1 and F (dt− bt−mt) = 1 in
equation (11) reduces it to:
it ≈ il. (27)
Case 2 Large borrowing value (bt > dt −mt + 3 ∗ σ)
For a sufficiently large borrowing value, dt − bt −mt < −3 ∗ σ, which implies
F (dt−bt−mt)→ 0 and F (−bt−mt)→ 0. The probability of the current account
balance that exceeds all the remaining reserve requirement, at the end of the day,
is one. Thus, by borrowing enough liquidity the bank is sure to satisfy its entire
reserve requirement and the bank is forced to deposit any remaining reserves in
the Central Bank. The bank would only borrow such reserves at the rate that
is no higher than the deposit facility rate. Substituting F (dt− bt−mt) = 0 and
F (−bt −mt) = 0 in eq.(11) leads to:
it ≈ id. (28)
Case 3 Intermediate borrowing value (−mt + 3 ∗ σ < bt < dt −mt − 3 ∗ σ)
At some intermediate borrowing value, within a specific range of values of mt,σ,
dt (so that there exists a bt that can satisfy this condition),
−bt −mt < −3 ∗ σ and dt − bt −mt > 3 ∗ σ, (29)
assuming normality means that the distribution functions of shock realisations
converge to F (−bt −mt) → 0 and F (dt − bt −mt) → 1. The last expression
can be also presented as 1 − F (dt − bt −mt) → 0. Now both the probability
of a negative current account balance and the probability of satisfying all the
remaining reserve requirement, are zero. It can be shown that in order for such
a borrowing value to exist, the deficiency must be significantly larger than the
standard deviation of the shock. A simple transformation of eq. (29) yields:
dt > 6 ∗ σ. (30)
Since dt is diminishing throughout the maintenance period, the condition is
much more likely to hold in the earlier rather than in the later part of the
maintenance period. Additionally, as the starting deficiency is linked with the
current account value and the length of the maintenance period, the condition
is also more likely to hold for markets with long maintenance periods and high
values of reserve requirement (compared with the liquidity shock volatility).
Using F (−bt−mt) = 0 and F (dt− bt−mt) = 1 in the equilibrium condition
(11) results in:
it ≈ −
∫ dt−bt−mt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(εt)dεt, (31)
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so the interest rate is fully determined by the dynamic cost factor. For the
analysed range of borrowing, this expression can be simplified as
it ≈ −
∫
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(εt)dεt. (32)
I can compute the derivatives of the value function ∂Vt∂dt using eq.(9) for the last
day of the maintenance period:
∂VT
∂dT
= −iT , (33)
and using eq.(12) for the preceding days:
∂VT−1
∂dT−1
= −id [1− F (dT−1 − bT−1 −mT−1)]
+
∫ dT−1−bT−1−mT−1
−∞
∂VT
∂dT
f(εT−1)dεT−1. (34)
In order to further simplify this expression, I can use F (dt − bt −mt) = 1,
and the above condition (33) to obtain:
∂VT−1
∂dT−1
= iT (35)
Provided the reserve requirement buffer given by (dt − bt −mt) is sufficiently
large, and the borrowing remains in a certain range, so that F (dt−bt−mt) = 1,
the property (35) holds for all days t preceding the end of the maintenance pe-
riod. Recall that the derivative of the value function indicates how much an
extra unit of deficiency changes the expected cost of borrowing and is referred
in a literature as the dynamic cost factor. The interpretation of eq.(35) is that
under certain assumptions, the dynamic cost factor remains constant, equal to
the expected level of the interest rate for every day of the maintenance period.
This property combined with condition (32) can be presented as:
it = E(iT ), (36)
which is an illustration of the celebrated martingale hypothesis. If the cur-
rent interest rate is equal to the expected rate in the future, the optimal borrow-
ing will be carried out within a range that will ensure that neither the deposit
nor lending facilities are ever used. The range of possible borrowing decisions
that could satisfy this condition is determined by the size of the remaining
deficiency when compared to liquidity shock volatility. Early on in the main-
tenance period (when the deficiency is large), or for banks that face relatively
little volatility, the range of possible borrowing decisions will be very large, thus
the equilibrium interest rate equal to the expected level is very likely to clear
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the market.
In this case, however, the interbank rate is mostly determined by the expec-
tations of the future interest rate, and is independent from the standing facilities
rate or current liquidity. As the end of the maintenance period draws closer, the
remaining deficiency becomes smaller compared to the shock volatility and it
is the current liquidity and implied probabilities of using the standing facilities
that determine the level of the interest rate.
This is a very important observation, as it might answer the question as to
why the martingale hypothesis only holds true only for some interbank markets.
In the markets with a significant reserve requirement (such as the Eurosystem)
and long maintenance periods, it is probably going to last until the end of the
maintenance period.
This observation was, in fact, confirmed in the empirical papers published
in the ECB working series. Moschitz (2004) builds a model of Euro Overnight
Index Average (Eonia) taking into account policy variables and operating policy
(such as open market operations). He finds that the liquidity effect only holds
for the four last days of the maintenance period, and that the main determi-
nants of the interest rate for the rest of the maintenance period are the expected
policy rate and expected liquidity on the last days of the maintenance period.
Similar results are obtained by Würtz (2003), who reports that the liquidity
only has an effect on the last two days of the maintenance period. The most
significant determinant of the interest rate is the expected policy rate.
The fact that some part of the demand schedule has a flat component has im-
plications for the determination of the market equilibrium within the framework
of this model.
If the interest rate is equal to the expected level, the individual banks do
not have a strictly determined optimal borrowing level. That means that there
might be multiple market clearing equilibria, each of them at the same level of
interest rate at different individual borrowing values. In fact, using Figure 1,
an equilibrium where all banks chose the point close to X1 is possible. But that
means that there will be an aggregate surplus of liquidity and the interest rate
will remain at the expected level.
This has important policy applications as it explains the reaction of the whole
market to aggregate liquidity changes. On one hand, the reserve requirement
secures the market from unexpected aggregate shocks, such as a change in the
autonomous factors which leads to a very low volatility of the interest rate. This
pattern has been well documented in Moschitz (2004) and Würtz (2003), but
another illustration is presented in Figure 3, which shows the spread before the
ECB target rate and Eonia. The only spikes on otherwise flat graph happen at
the end of the maintenance period.
From the Central Bank’s perspective, such behaviour in the market indicates
that the liquidity injections, which are the main tool of the monetary policy,
will remain largely inefficient in controlling the market interest rate for the ma-
jority of maintenance period. In order to affect the level of the interest rate
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Figure 3: Euro Overnight Index Average (Eonia) Spread
for the interbank market, the central bank needs to focus on the control of the
expectations.
This feature has also affected the design of the simulation. In particular,
I was faced with the problem of which equilibrium point to choose, provided
the interest rates remain on target. I have decided in favour of the liquidity
neutral policy (that is, each bank attempts to end the day with the current
account equal to average required reserves) but the framework of this paper is
not sufficient to theoretically justify that choice. However, if banks wanted to
avoid excess borrowing and lending, intuitively the best strategy would involve
setting the current account volume to the average required level.
To summarise the findings of this section, the shape of the demand sched-
ule might have significant policy implications. Provided that the expectations
for future interest rates remain unchanged, the market will not react to small
changes in liquidity, resulting, for example from errors in the estimations of the
autonomous liquidity factors.
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The demand schedule under a liquidity shortage
The inspection of the demand schedule (for example in Figure 1) reveals that
it takes a very similar shape under a liquidity shortage (left part of the graph)
for the days preceding the end of the maintenance period. On the other hand,
the demand seems to differ for different days under the liquidity excess. This is
related to a certain asymmetry in the averaging provision reserve requirement
regime. In eq. (11) the probability of using the lending facilities (under liquidity
shortage) depends solely on the current account balance which remains relatively
stable for different days of the RMP. Thus, for all the days, the probability of
using the lending facility remains essentially the same. However, the probability
of using the deposit facility is tied to the remaining deficiency value, which
decreases toward the end of the maintenance period (recall the condition (30)).
This means the demand schedule at excess liquidity will have different shape for
different days of the maintenance period.
This particular feature might be important in an analysis of the behaviour
of the interbank market when faced with an aggregate shock that is not offset
by the Central Bank. In particular, the market behaviour might experience an
asymmetric pattern depending on the direction of the shock. The prediction
based on the model is that the interest rate is much more likely to deviate from
the neutral level when the market is faced with a liquidity shortage, rather than
a liquidity surplus.
5.2 Central Bank intervention
The demand curves in the section above were constructed under constant inter-
est rate expectations. In reality, however, this might constitute a very strong
assumption. The section below justifies using it in the simulation model.
The most important reasons for the rate to deviate from the target on the
last day of the maintenance period are:
1. Due to the fact that banks want to avoid the “lock-in” state (when all
the deficiency is exhausted) the model predicts some incentives for back-
loading (postponing satisfying the reserve requirement until the end of the
maintenance period), which would lower the average rate in the beginning
of the period and raise it at the end. These incentives are particularly
strong for a case where the reserve requirement buffer is low compared to
the shock volatility.
2. During the maintenance period, some banks make errors in the liquidity
management that force them to use their standing facilities. This results
in an aggregate change in the market liquidity, which is then directly
reflected on the last day. Sophisticated banks will base their expectations
on the estimated level of liquidity at the end of the maintenance period.
3. Variable rate tenders tend to typically end up with a marginal allotment
rate (all bids above that rate are accepted) that is higher than the min-
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imum bid rate (set at the target level). If the banks believe that the
marginal allotment rate is a better proxy for future market rates, they
will adjust their expectations accordingly.15
These points illustrate the fact that there are solid reasons why the expectations
might differ from the target level of the Central Bank. In order to counter these
effects, the ECB performs several interventions during the maintenance period -
including fine tuning operations on the very last day of the maintenance period.
Operations implemented at the end of the maintenance period, if performed
in a timely and precise fashion, can, in practice, cancel out the first two ef-
fects listed above, but may face some troubles in countering the last one. This
is caused by the design of open market operations, and, in particular, their
asymmetric nature in the ECB regime. Depending on whether they constitute
liquidity supply or draining, they take the form of either variable or fixed rate
tenders. In variable rate tenders, the rate at which funds are supplied is typ-
ically higher than the minimum bid rate, which has been discussed in detail
by Välimäki (2006). Liquidity draining operations are performed in the form
of fixed rate tenders that efficiently anchor the rate at the target level. That
means, however, that the policy will only be able to efficiently tie the market
interest rate to the desired level in a case where there is a liquidity surplus,
and will fail to do that under a liquidity shortage. Since the ECB can chose
whether to enter the last part of the maintenance period with an aggregate liq-
uidity shortage or surplus (by adjusting the previous operation volumes), it can
effectively control the level of the interest on the last day of the maintenance
period and the corresponding expected levels.
This policy is reflected in the simulation code. In practice, I assume that
the Central Bank adjusts the aggregate market liquidity to neutral level on the
last day of the maintenance period.16
5.3 Risk aversion
Before moving to the actual simulation study, let me elaborate on the issue of
risk aversion.
In the model above I have assumed risk neutrality which implied the banks
only care for the expected cost of funding. In reality however, one might question
such an assumption and argue instead that banks are risk averse. That means
that the banks not only care about the expected value of their funding cost but
also about the cost variance.
In particular, one might suspect that since the last day typically experiences
the highest variance of the interest rate, banks that expect a net outflow of
liquidity would like, for example, to front-load in order to avoid using the market
as a funding source.
15In fact, some indication of such a behaviour has been found in Würtz (2003).
16By neutral level, I mean the central account balances that are equal to the remaining part
of the reserve requirement.
26
To see how a bank might accomplish that within this framework, one can
use the model to compute the last day profit variance. For the last day of the
maintenance period, the cost equation (3) implies17:
var(cost) = var (iT bT + E(cT )) = var
(
iT bT + (il − id)
[∫ ∞
0
εT f(εT )dεT
])
.
(37)
The second part of the expression in brackets is just an expected value of
cost which - at optimal borrowing - is always equal to zero. That allows for a
further simplification of eq. (37):
var(iT bT ) = b2T var(iT ) = (dT − mT )2var(iT ). (38)
The variance of the cost depends on the interest rate variance and the value
of interbank trade 18.
What can a risk averse bank do to minimise its risk exposure? I can safely
assume that the variance of the interest rate is exogenous, and the starting value
of current account mT on day T is determined by past shock realisations. The
only variable that can be controlled by the bank is the deficiency dT given by
dT = dT−1 −mT−1 − εT−1 − bT−1. (39)
A bank that is willing to minimise the variance in the last period needs to
adjust his borrowing activity so that
E(dT ) = E(mT ). (40)
This condition will be satisfied at a borrowing value of
bT−1 = dT−1 − 2 ∗mT−1, (41)
which means that the risk aversion motive might determine the exact value
of borrowing for all days preceding the end of the maintenance period.
6 Simulation results
The above sections contain the analytical analysis of the base model. The
crucial equations become, however, analytically intractable for more than 3
periods while in reality, the maintenance periods stretch as far as 20 days (in
17As shown in Appendix E.
18To understand the last transition, recall from the previous sections that on last day of the
maintenance period, the optimal borrowing is the simple difference between the bank’s assets
and remaining deficiency.
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the Eurosystem). Hence, to analyse the behaviour of the model in a more
realistic scenario, I turn to numerical simulations.
The first scenario that I look into is the benchmark model where I assume ho-
mogeneous banks, a symmetric corridor system, aggregate liquidity sufficient to
satisfy the reserve requirement and a low value for the liquidity shock variance,
which resembles the Eurosystem. In later sections, I allow for heterogeneity, an
asymmetric corridor system, aggregate shock and different values for the idio-
syncratic shock variance to see the impact of those assumptions on the market
behaviour. A summary concludes this section.
The results of the simulations are presented in the form of tables. Each table
includes the following information:
• the average market clearing rate for each day of the maintenance period
(the Central Bank target is 2.5%),
• the interest rate volatility,
• the average use of the standing facilities.
6.1 Benchmark scenario
I start out by presenting the results for a benchmark scenario with the following
assumptions:
1. The banks are homogeneous; each of them has the same asset and defi-
ciency value as well as being faced by i.i.d. liquidity shock (for hetero-
geneity, see section 6.2.).
2. The liquidity shock is idiosyncratic in that there is no aggregate shock to
the market (as it is fully offset by the Central Bank). For the analysis of
the aggregate shock, see section 6.4.
3. The parameters of the simulation are calibrated to the Eurosystem values.
The most important parameter is the shock volatility as compared to the
bank’s assets. Based on the discussion in the section above, I have used
a shock standard deviation equal to roughly 1/10 of the bank asset size.
For a different size of the shock variance, check section 6.5.
4. With no aggregate liquidity outflow (or inflow), there is no practical need
for extra Central Bank intervention on the last day of the RMP apart from
a countering of the use of the standing facilities during the maintenance
period.
5. A symmetric corridor system with the target rate that lies between the
standing facilities rate. For an asymmetric corridor, see section 6.3.
The parameters of this scenario were chosen to resemble the Eurosystem. The
reserve requirement is very high, which forces the commercial banks to maintain
a high value for the current account (in the simulation, I use an assets size of
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Day Mean Rate Rate Volatility Deposit facility Lending facility
1 2.50 - - -
2 2.50 - - -
... 2.50 - - -
19 2.50 - - -
20 2.50 0.00 43.00 43.00
Table 4: The benchmark scenario
The mean and standard deviation (volatility) of the interest rate; deposit/lending facility
values refer to the average use across all simulation runs.
100, where the liquidity shock standard deviation is 10). That, however, means
that the shocks are not likely to force the commercial bank to use the standing
facilities during the maintenance period. That is, indeed, what I observed in
the simulation results presented in Table 4, where the differences in the target
interest rate level drop to zero for all days of the maintenance period. With the
shock so small, hardly any bank risks making mistakes and losing their reserve
requirement buffer too soon; this means that, on the last day of the RMP, the
market liquidity will be just sufficient to satisfy the reserve requirement hence
no last day operations are necessary (or their volume is zero). This, according
to equation (5), means that the rates remain exactly on target.
Despite having no volatility at all, the scenario can be used to gain some
interesting insight. Probably the most important factor one concerns the im-
portance of the idiosyncratic shock on the behaviour of the interbank market.
Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) explain the deviation from the
martingale hypothesis with simply an idiosyncratic shock that stimulates back-
loading19 to avoid a lock-in state (where the deficiency is satisfied before the
end of the maintenance period). Here, I find that in case of the values of the
liquidity shock variance that are close to those of the Eurosystem, this effect -
while still possibly present - is too small to make any difference. This is related
to the modelling strategy and the flat shape of the demand curves (see section
5.1 for details), which results in market clearing rate equal to the expected rate
for a wide range of borrowing decisions. Thus, the individual realisation of the
idiosyncratic shock and distribution of liquidity among the banks seem to play
no significant role in the evolution of the interest rate.
In the remaining part of the section, I will attempt to verify the robustness
of those results by analyzing some of the assumptions utilised.
6.2 Heterogeneous banks
In the benchmark scenario from section 6.1, I have assumed that all the banks
are homogeneous and are facing shocks drawn from the same distribution. With
19Postponing satisfaction of the reserve requirement.
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the reserve requirement (or average current account volume) at a fairly high level
in comparison with the volatility of the liquidity shock, the probability of being
forced to use the standing facilities was very low. That meant that there was
nearly always an equilibrium where the market cleared at the target rate (equal
to the expectations for the last day’s rate).
In this section, I attempt to verify if the results still hold when I allow for:
• Heterogeneous banks - more specifically, I use two groups of banks with
different assets.
• Heterogeneous exposure to the liquidity shock - by forcing both small and
large banks to draw their shocks from the same distribution.
This might be justified in the following way. In reality, the market experiences
much more variety. There are both large and small banks subject to the reserve
requirement and liquidity shock, as indicated in my sample. Recall that the
average current account size was EUR 760M with a standard deviation EUR
960M. It might then be useful to analyse the importance of the homogeneity
assumption, and I have repeated the simulations for a heterogeneous case. First,
I divided the banks into 2 groups. One group was given an assets size of 100
(as in the benchmark case) and the other of 10 (equal to the shock standard
deviation).
In the benchmark scenario, I have assumed that the bank size and liquidity
shock variance is proportional. The regression from section 4 confirms that
such a link indeed exists, but also that there is a lot left unexplained by simply
looking at the current account size, and small banks might be, in fact, subject
to larger shocks (relative to their size) than big banks. Therefore, it might
be interesting to verify how important the homogeneity assumption is for my
results.
For that, I subject both bank groups to the liquidity shock drawn from the
same distribution. That means that nothing changes for large banks compared
to benchmark scenario, but small banks now face a substantial increase in un-
certainty.
The results from the simulation are presented in Table 5. As one could
predict, the smaller banks are much more likely to use their standing facilities,
especially the lending facility. The reason is that, with such a small reserve re-
quirement, their average current account balance is way too small to sufficiently
protect them against late negative shocks. After several periods, some of them
also lose the reserve requirement buffer and (starting from period t = 11) they
start using the deposit facility as well. Those in a lock-in state have no more
incentives to maintain a positive balance on the current account (as the rela-
tive expected cost of lost profits is equal to the expected cost of the borrowing
facility), thereby reducing their balances to zero and further increasing the fre-
quency of the need to use the lending facility. These observations only concern
small banks. Those banks with a large buffer are not affected by the use of the
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Day Mean Rate Rate Volatility Deposit facility Lending facility
1 2.50 - - 5.34
2 2.50 - - 5.56
3 2.50 - - 6.14
4 2.50 - - 5.63
5 2.50 - - 6.06
6 2.50 - - 6.42
7 2.50 - - 6.52
8 2.50 - - 6.41
9 2.50 - - 6.22
10 2.50 - - 4.49
11 2.50 - 0.00 3.62
12 2.50 - 0.02 3.69
13 2.50 - 0.08 5.09
14 2.50 - 0.53 11.30
15 2.5001 0.0002 15.31 33.53
16 2.5001 0.0003 16.81 32.02
17 2.5002 0.0004 14.71 26.93
18 2.5002 0.0004 14.21 22.63
19 2.4996 0.0067 14.55 20.08
20 2.50 0.0000 43.30 43.30
Table 5: Heterogeneous banks
The mean and standard deviation (volatility) of the interest rate; deposit/lending facility
values refer to the average use across all simulation runs.
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standing facilities until the last day of the maintenance period, when the aggre-
gate liquidity shortage (or excess) is transmitted to the behaviour of the interest
rate. In this scenario, however, I do allow for the Central Bank intervention,
which assures that the interest rate level on the last day of the RMP stays on
target (hence, no volatility on the last day).
The impact of heterogeneity on the interest rate is very small. For the bet-
ter part of the maintenance period, even though there is a constant inflow of
liquidity (from the borrowing facility used by small banks), it is still possible to
find borrowing levels that would clear the market at the target rate. This only
changes later on in the maintenance period, resulting in a tiny volatility of the
interest rate, which at most reaches a value of 0.007. This is due to the fact
that small banks have very little effect on the market behaviour as a whole.
The conclusion for this section is that the introduction of heterogeneity does
have an impact on the use of the standing facilities, but it is too small to
substantially affect the market rate.
6.3 Asymmetric corridor system
In the simulation design this so far, I have assumed that the expected (and the
Central Bank target) rate lies exactly between the deposit and lending facility
rate. The implications of this assumption are discussed in this section.
The spread between the standing facility rates offered by the ECB is fixed at
200 basis points and the target rate falls precisely in the middle of the corridor.
The symmetry of the corridor is, however, distorted by additional factors that
restrict the use of the facilities. This can be confirmed by analysing the avail-
able data on the spread between the Eonia and ECB target and the liquidity
conditions on the last day of the maintenance period. It can be shown that even
though the model predicts that for the symmetric corridor, the neutral liquid-
ity in the last day of the maintenance period should result in a rate exactly in
the middle of the target, this is not actually the case. A simple regression of
the spread on the net use of the standing facilities has a constant component
equal to roughly 7 basis points. Also, the analysis of the use of the facilities
reveals that the deposit facility is much more often used than the lending fa-
cility, which, according to the Poole model, should create an easy arbitrage
opportunity without additional costs.
One explanation for this puzzle might be related to the collateral required
to use the lending facilities. Also, the banks need to apply to use the facility
each time, thereby creating some operating expenses.20 Since the penalties for
overdraft far exceed the cost of lost profits from the deposit facility, banks that
want to play it safe will prefer to maintain a surplus rather than risking a
shortage. Finally, there might be several other factors which are not so easy to
20Although some countries in the Eurosystem, such as Finland, allow for the automatic use
of the standing facilities.
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quantify that could distort the symmetry of standing facilities. An example of
this would be window dressing at the end of the year.
Those restrictions introduce a certain asymmetry into the actual cost of the
standing facilities as perceived by the commercial banks, and, in this section, I
analyse the impact of this asymmetry on the model behaviour. In particular, I
analyse a case where the cost of the lending facility is higher than the nominal
value.
The actual modification of the model, in order for it to reflect asymmetric
facilities, is fairly straightforward. Since the incentives I mentioned above are
present in all the days of the maintenance period, I increase the lending facility
rate by 20 basis points throughout the entire simulation. A brief inspection
of the condition (5) for the last day of the maintenance period reveals that
raising the lending rate il means that the equilibrium interest rate at neutral
liquidity (when the use of both standing facilities is equally likely) will be above
the central target. But that means that without an additional Central Bank
intervention, the expected rate on the last day will raise with a corresponding
increase in the rate for an every day of the maintenance period. The results
from the simulation (not reported here since they closely resemble the bench-
mark scenario) confirm that such behaviour actually takes place.
6.4 Aggregate shock
In the scenarios described above, I have assumed that the liquidity shock is
idiosyncratic and have found that its impact on the interbank market (for the
parameter values close to the Eurosystem) is small. If the Central Bank’s inter-
ventions to offset the changes in the autonomous liquidity factors are performed
frequently, the only outflow (or inflow) of liquidity could result from the use of
the standing facilities. In this section, I modify that assumption and allow the
aggregate liquidity to change every day.
In terms of modelling, this can be accomplished by adding an additional
early shock realisation to the model. The timing looks almost identical to the
one presented before:
mt, dt εet bt εt mt+1, dt+1.−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
The additional shock εet occurs in the morning, before the market opens
and bt is calculated. I assumed this shock to have parameters similar to the
idiosyncratic one (i.e. the mean zero and standard deviation σ = 10), but its
aggregate value might be different from zero. In order to assure that the market
expectations of the interest rate are correct, I need the central bank intervention
on the last day of the maintenance period.
The results are presented in Table 6. Note that the use of the lending facil-
ity does not change from the benchmark scenario. This is obvious: unless the
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Day Mean Rate Rate Volatility Deposit facility Lending facility
1 2.50 - - -
2 2.50 - - -
... 2.50 - - -
12 2.50 - - -
13 2.50 0.00 - -
14 2.50 0.00 - -
15 2.50 0.00 - -
16 2.50 0.02 0.42 -
17 2.49 0.07 8.95 -
18 2.44 0.16 64.42 0.01
19 2.35 0.22 216.72 0.20
20 2.51 0.14 47.96 47.88
Table 6: Aggregate shock
The mean and standard deviation (volatility) of the interest rate; deposit/lending facilities
values refer to the average use across all simulation runs.
banks lose their reserve requirement bonus, they will be inclined to maintain
the current account balance sufficient to offset a negative liquidity shock. Recall
that the late liquidity shock has a small variance compared to the asset value.
I will analyse the cases of aggregate liquidity shortage and surplus separately
as they occur with the same probability, but have quite a different impact on
the market behaviour.
First, assume that the additional shock caused an aggregate liquidity short-
age on the market. The banks’ current account balances are lower, but, with a
low shock volatility, even the remaining balances are sufficient to protect them
from the borrowing facility. The satisfaction of the reserve requirement is be-
hind schedule (in comparison to the benchmark), but the banks assume that by
the last day of the maintenance period the Central Bank will provide the liq-
uidity necessary to satisfy the reserve requirement. That causes the temporary
shortage of liquidity to have little impact on the use of the standing facilities
and interest rate.
On the other hand, the scenario involving a liquidity surplus is more inter-
esting. Even a minor liquidity surplus from, for example, day t = 1 that is
not countered by the Central Bank intervention (which is assumed to happen
only on the last day) contributes to the reserve requirement for each day of the
remaining part of the maintenance period. This might cause some banks to end
up in the lock-in state and explains the use of the deposit facilities.
The behaviour of the interest rate can be explained by a combination of
those two effects. In this scenario, the market is either short or has a surplus of
liquidity. The market is not affected by the liquidity shortage, but the surplus
will cause some banks to become locked up, thereby forcing them to use the
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deposit facility and depressing the interest rate.
This section offers some interesting findings in terms of the optimal policy
setup. The results suggest that in order to keep the interest rate equal to
the target level in the presence of aggregate shocks, it is actually better to
maintain an aggregate liquidity shortage for the entire maintenance period and
to supply the amount required to satisfy the reserve requirement on the last
day. This would allow the banks to sustain the reserve requirement buffer while
maintaining sufficient funds to offset negative late shocks. A reverse policy (i.e.
liquidity surplus during the maintenance period and a draining of the excess on
the last day) could result in several banks finding themselves in a lock-in state,
which drives the rate below the target as they have no way to insure against
positive shocks.
6.5 Large idiosyncratic shock
In the scenarios presented above, I have demonstrated that an idiosyncratic
shock of a size similar to the one observed in the Eurosystem has little impact
on the behaviour of the interest rate. In this section, I analyse what happens if
the liquidity shock volatility is higher and the model is otherwise unchanged.
In terms of modelling assumptions, I set the variance of the liquidity shock
at σ = 100 (compared with σ = 10 in the benchmark scenario), which is equal to
the starting assets value. Similar parameter values were used in earlier research.
I have assumed that the Central Bank intervention provides the market with
neutral liquidity on the last day of the maintenance period, thus also setting the
expected interest rate at the target level. The results are presented in Table 7.
Note that the increase in the standard deviation has a substantial impact
on the market behaviour. The lending facility is used much more extensively,
which can be explained by a much higher volatility of the shock compared to the
average current account balance. Contrary to the benchmark case, this buffer
does not seem to be too small to save the banks from the negative shocks.
Increased volatility has, however, much less impact on the use of the deposit fa-
cility. This is due to the fact that the reserve requirement buffer (for 20 periods)
is sufficient to secure the banks from even very large positive shocks. This ex-
plains the discrepancy in using the standing facilities observed in the simulation.
The constant use of the lending facility, without a corresponding increase
in the deposit facility constitutes a steady inflow of liquidity in the system
which, at some point, will drive the rates down. The banks still have the
incentive for back-loading (as in the Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal
(2006) model), which is reflected by a starting that is lower than the Central
Bank target level. The back-loading is, however, smaller than the liquidity effect
so the interest rate is decreasing. This was not observed by Pérez-Quirós and
Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006), as their model only covered 4 periods.
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Day Mean Rate Rate Volatility Deposit facility Lending facility
1 2.47 - - 71.09
2 2.47 - - 67.08
3 2.47 - - 69.12
4 2.47 0.00 - 72.11
5 2.47 0.00 - 73.32
6 2.47 0.00 - 75.91
7 2.47 0.00 - 76.51
8 2.46 0.01 - 77.01
9 2.46 0.01 - 76.38
10 2.46 0.01 - 76.89
11 2.45 0.01 0.00 79.10
12 2.45 0.01 0.00 80.36
13 2.45 0.01 0.15 83.60
14 2.44 0.01 0.75 86.08
15 2.43 0.01 3.05 91.04
16 2.42 0.02 13.08 95.13
17 2.40 0.02 50.25 101.23
18 2.35 0.04 183.24 104.25
19 2.23 0.08 535.87 110.94
20 2.50 - 380.88 380.88
Table 7: Large idiosyncratic shock
The mean and standard deviation (volatility) of the interest rate; deposit/lending facilities
values refer to the average use across all simulation runs.
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6.6 Simulation summary
In the section above, I have presented the results of the simulations using the pa-
rameters calibrated in section 4. I have also verified whether changing different
assumptions will change the results in a significant way.
The main conclusion is that the benchmark model provides a good approx-
imation of the actual market behaviour. In all days of the maintenance period,
other than the last one the interest rate remains equal to the expected level. I
observe little variation in the interest level, and hardly any bank satisfies the
reserve requirement early. Since some of the underlying assumptions could be
perceived as strong, I have also run the simulation by allowing banks to ex-
hibit heterogeneity, an asymmetric corridor, aggregate shock and a large shock
volatility.
The first scenario allows for the heterogeneity of the banks. Small banks
are much more vulnerable to randomness and have to use the standing facilities
more extensively. However, their influence is too small to significantly affect the
whole market.
In the second scenario, I allow for an asymmetric corridor between the stand-
ing facilities. I find that the interest rate remains tied to the expected level on
the last day of the maintenance period and that market behaviour depends on
Central Bank’s ability to affect those expectations.
In the third scenario, I allow for an additional early shock that affects the
aggregate market liquidity. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that there is
now an asymmetry between the use of the deposit and lending facilities. The
average use of the lending facility is not affected, since the banks still have
enough liquidity to secure safe end of the day balances (a shortage of liquidity
is assumed to be covered by the Central Bank on the last day). If the market
is, however, flooded with cash, more and more banks would find themselves
in an irreversible lock-in state. In this case, the market rate would be pushed
below the target. However, those results assume that the only Central Bank
intervention takes place on the last day of the maintenance period.
Finally, I attempt to compare my model with the model of Pérez-Quirós
and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) by verifying what happens if I increase the
liquidity shock variance. My model covers 20 periods (whereas they only look
at a 4-day maintenance period) and the effect of the liquidity inflow from the
lending facility exceeds the motivation to back-load, which is why I actually
observe a drop rather than an increase in the interest rate. The rate, however,
starts at a level below the target, which is consistent with their finding.
7 Conclusions
To summarise, the main finding of this paper is that the behaviour of the inter-
bank interest rate is related to the relative size of the liquidity shock volatility
and reserve requirement. I find that, for the Eurosystem, the volatility of the
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liquidity shock is significantly lower that the average current account holding.
That has a significant impact on the behaviour of the interest rate through-
out the maintenance period. Early on, the interest rate is determined by the
expectations, and the market liquidity starts to matter only at the end of the
maintenance period.
The most important theoretical contribution was to find and explain the flat
parts in the demand schedule of individual banks.
If the market rates equal to standing facilities, the banks will be indifferent
between the market borrowing and using the facilities.
At a market rate equal to the expected rate in the future, provided the defi-
ciency is substantially larger than the shock volatility, the banks are indifferent
between different levels of borrowing. This can be used to explain a low volatil-
ity and the lack of a liquidity effect in the market early on in the maintenance
period.
In this paper, I also calibrated the size of the liquidity shock standard de-
viation relative to the average current account holdings, which seems to be a
crucial relationship for the behaviour of the model. Based on the sample from
86 banks in the Eurosystem, I have found that the average shock standard de-
viation stands roughly at 10% of the current account on the last days of the
maintenance period. Note that this is the first estimate of the liquidity shock
size, hence, it is impossible to compare it directly with similar research in that
field.
In the numerical part, I simulate the behaviour of the market for 20 periods.
I found that, for the calibrated parameters, I was able to duplicate the behav-
iour of the Eurosystem fairly well. The market rate remains on target and the
use of the standing facilities is very low. The robustness of the assumptions
has been verified by running the simulations with bank heterogeneity, an asym-
metric corridor system, aggregate shock and a large idiosyncratic shock. For
each of these factors, I was able to explain the difference in comparison with
the benchmark model.
A Simulation description
The problem has a recursive structure and, therefore, I start solving it from the
last day of the maintenance period. The general algorithm takes the following
form:
1. Calculate the possible states that include value functions for all the periods
and possible assets paths
• To calculate the values of the assets, I use the grid equal to 3 x the
shock standard deviation (per one period) which covers most of the
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distribution. The deficiency can simply vary between D (the amount
set by the Central Bank) and zero.
• In period T , the value function is simply equal to the expected rate.
Through most of the simulation, I assume that the expected rate is
equal to the target of the Central Bank.
• In period T − 1 and earlier, formula (12) is used to calculate the
derivatives for each possible realisation of the assets and deficiency.
The result ∂bt∂mt = −1, as shown in Appendix F, greatly simplifies the
computations here.
2. Generate the idiosyncratic shock realisations and update the value of the
assets for each bank separately.
3. Determine the market clearing rate and optimal borrowing
• To determine the interest rate, I am using a simple bijection algo-
rithm: calculate the aggregate borrowing for 2 different rates and
check, if for any of them, it is equal to zero. If so, I have found
the market clearing rate; otherwise I repeat for the calculations for
another guess of the interest rate.
• To find the value of aggregate borrowing, I have to calculate the
borrowing of each individual bank separately. To do that, I utilise
the formula (11) and use previously saved (in step 1) values of the
derivative of the value function.
• Due to the fact that the demand curve has a flat component (espe-
cially at lower values of shock standard deviation in comparison to
the assets and deficiency, such as is usually the case in the beginning
of the maintenance period), it is possible that the same level of rates
will correspond to different borrowing decisions. That leads to mul-
tiple equilibrium at the same interest rate, from which I pick the one
that clears the market and is close to a neutral borrowing level.
4. Apply the borrowing decision as well as a final shock and calculate new
states. Move one period ahead and repeat the procedure.
B Proof of the results from section (3.1)
The expected cost function can be then rewritten as
iT bT + E(cT ) (42)
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where iT bT stands for the cost of interbank borrowing and E(cT ) denotes ex-
pected the cost of using the standing facilities given by
E(cT ) = il
[∫ −mT−bT+dT
−∞
(−mT − bT + dT − εT )f(εT )dεT
]
− id
[∫ ∞
−mT−bT+dT
(mT + bT − dT + εT )f(εT )dεT
]
=
= −il(mT + bT − dT )F (−mT − bT + dT )
− id(mT + bT − dT )(1− F (−mT − bT + dT ))
− il
∫ −mT−bT+dT
−∞
εT f(εT )dεT − id
∫ ∞
−mT−bT+dT
εT f(εT )dεT (43)
The first order conditions for that problem with respect to bt are:
− it = −ilF (−mt − bt + dt) + il(mt + bt − dt)f(−mt − bt + dt)
− id(1− F (−mt − bt + dt))− id(mt + bt − dt)f(−mt − bt + dt)
− il(mt + bt − dt)f(−mt − bt + dt) + id(mt + bt − dt)f(−mt − bt + dt) (44)
where the last line follows from the Leibniz rule. Rearranging yields:
it = ilF (−mt − bt + dt) + id(1 − F (−mt − bt + dt)) (45)
C Proof of the results from section (3.2)
Proof of equation (11)
The value function for the problem takes the following form:
Vt = min
bt
Et(itbt + ct + Vt+1) (46)
which can be rewritten using the slightly modified expected cost expression (4):
Et(Vt) = itbt − il(mt + bt)F (−mt − bt)
− id(mt + bt − dt)(1− F (−mt − bt + dt))
− il
[∫ −mt−bt
−∞
εtf(εt)dεt
]
− id
[∫ ∞
−mt−bt+dt
εtf(εt)dεt
]
+ EVt+1 (47)
The first order conditions:
it = ilF (−mt − bt) + id(1 − F (−mt − bt + dt)) + E∂Vt+1
∂bt
(48)
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To calculate the last element of the F.O.C. first note that the borrowing
maturity is one period, hence it has no direct impact on the asset value and
borrowing in the next period. It has, however, impact on the deficiency value,
which must be analysed in 3 separate cases:
1. The shock forces the bank to use a lending facility, whereby the deficiency
remains unchanged.
2. The shock forces the bank to use a deposit facility, whereby all deficiency
gets satisfied.
3. The intermediate case, where the shock value only lowers the deficiency
without forcing the bank to use any of the facilities.
In the first two cases, the deficiency either remains unchanged (in comparison
with the previous period) or drops to zero, whereby the borrowing decision has
no impact on its value.∫ −mt−bt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂bt
f(ε)dε =
∫ ∞
−mt+dt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂bt
f(ε)dε =∫ −mt−bt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
∂dt+1
∂bt
f(ε)dε = 0. (49)
In the last case, whenever the deficiency is carried over one period, one more
unit of borrowed funds decreases it by the same value, hence,∫ −mt−bt+dt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂bt
f(ε)dε =
∫ −mt−bt+dt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
∂dt+1
∂bt
f(ε)dε =
−
∫ −mt−bt+dt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(ε)dε (50)
leading to profit maximising conditions:
it = ilF (−bt−mt)+id [1− F (dt − bt −mt)]−
∫ dt−bt−mt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(ε)dε. (51)

Proof of equation (12)
The derivative of the value function with respect to deficiency can be solved
using an envelope theorem (so the ∂Vt∂bt = 0) :
∂Vt
∂dt
=
∂
∂dt
(E(ct) + EVt+1)
∂
∂dt
{
id(mt + bt − dt)(1− F (−mt − bt + dt)) + id
[∫ ∞
−mt−bt+dt
εtf(εt)dεt
]
+EVt+1} (52)
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since the deficiency has no impact on the lending facility use, I only have to
analyse the deposit facility probability. That leads to:
∂Vt
∂dt
= id {−(1− F (−mt − bt + dt))− (mt + bt − dt)f(−mt − bt + dt)
−(−mt − bt + dt)f(−mt − bt − dt)}+E∂Vt+1
∂dt
= −id [1− F (−mt − bt + dt)]+E∂Vt+1
∂dt
.
(53)
In a manner similar to that above, I analyse 3 cases:
1. The shock forces the bank to use a lending facility, whereby the deficiency
remains unchanged.
∂dt+1
∂dt
= 1→
∫ −mt−bt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂dt
f(ε)dε =
∫ −mt−bt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(ε)dε. (54)
2. The shock forces the bank to use a deposit facility, whereby all deficiency
gets satisfied so
∂dt+1
∂dt
= 0→
∫ ∞
dt−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt
f(ε)dε = 0. (55)
3. The intermediate case, where the shock value only lowers the deficiency
without forcing the bank to use any of the facilities is similar to case 1.
∂dt+1
∂dt
= 1→
∫ dt−mt−bt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt
f(ε)dε =
∫ dt−mt−bt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(ε)dε, (56)
which results in:
∂Vt
∂dt
= −id [1− F (dt − bt −mt)] +
∫ dt−bt−mt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(ε)dε. (57)

D Proof of the results from section 3.3
Proof of equation (17):
The equilibrium interest rate at time 2 is given by
i2 = ilF (−b2 −m2) + id [1− F (d2 − b2 −m2)]
+ E(i3) [F (d2 − b2 −m2)− F (−b2 −m2)] . (58)
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To find the level of liquidity that corresponds to the middle of the corridor
system, assume that i2 = E(i3) = (id+ il)/2. That implies, il− i2 = −(id− i2).
Now I can deduct i2 from both sides of the equation:
0 = (il − i2)F (−b2 − m2) + (id − i2) [1− F (d2 − b2 −m2)] . (59)
Assuming the shock distribution is symmetric around zero 1−F (•) = F (−•)
and divided by (il − i2)
F (−b2 −m2) = F (−d2 + b2 +m2), (60)
and finally
m2 + b2 =
d2
2
. (61)

E Proof of the results from section (5.3)
Proof of equation (38)
The cost function is given by the following expression:
var(cost) = var {itbt + E(ct)} . (62)
Recall that the optimal borrowing in the case of a symmetric corridor system
is equal to bt = mt − dt. But, in that case, the expected cost reduces to:
E(cT ) = il
[∫ −mT−bT+dT
−∞
(−mT − bT + dT − εT )f(εT )dεT
]
−
id
[∫ ∞
−mT+bT+dT
(mT − bT − dT + εT )f(εT )dεT
]
− il
[∫ 0
−∞
εT f(εT )dεT
]
− id
[∫ ∞
0
εT f(εT )dεT
]
=
(il − id)
∫ ∞
0
εT f(εT )dεT , (63)
since ∫ 0
−∞
εT f(εT )dεT = −
∫ ∞
0
εT f(εT )dεT , (64)
so it is a constant non-random value. The cost variance then reduces to:
var (−itbt + E(ct)) = var
(
it(dt −mt) + (il − id)
[∫ ∞
0
εT f(εT )dεT
])
=
(dt −mt)2var(it). (65)

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F Proof of the equation used in the simulation
In the simulation study, the following result greatly simplifies the complexity of
the computations:
∂bt
∂mt
= −1 (66)
for all periods before the end of the maintenance period.
The key equations for the days prior to the end of the RMP are:
it = ilF (−bt −mt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.
+ id [1− F (dt − bt −mt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.
−
∫ dt−bt−mt
−mt−bt
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(εt)dεt︸ ︷︷ ︸
3.
(67)
∂Vt
∂dt
= −id [1− F (dt − bt −mt)] +
∫ dt−bt−mt
−∞
∂Vt+1
∂dt+1
f(εt)dεt. (68)
In all of these equations, the terms bt and mt appear only as a pair (bt+mt).
That means, however, that the derivative is
∂it
∂mt
=
∂it
∂bt
. (69)
Hence, the application of the implicit theorem yields:
∂bt
∂mt
= −
∂it
∂mt
∂it
∂bt
= −1 (70)
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